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ARGUMENT
I.

THE OUTCOME IN COTTON PETROLEUM DOES NOT DICTATE THE RESULT
IN THIS CASE.
The Government Defendants seek to justify the lower

court's ruling on the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).

They

claim that the Supreme Court's holding "squarely applies" to the
facts of this case.

Brief of Appellees at 12.

The Supreme

Court's holding in Cotton cannot be given the talismanic effect
the Government Defendants divine from the Supreme Court's words.
This Court cannot ignore the factual distinctions which
differentiate Cotton from the circumstances of this case.
Applying the same analysis to the facts here leads to a different
result.
A.

The Analysis in Cotton Was Based on Pre-Existing
Statutory Authority for State Taxation.
The leases under consideration in Cotton were issued

under the 1938 Act.17

As noted by the Supreme Court in that

case, the 1938 Act was silent on the issue of state taxation.
490 U.S. at 177.

In reviewing the legislative history of the

1938 Act and the legislation which preceded the 1938 Act as part
of its "particularized examination of the relevant state,
federal, and tribal interests," id. at 176, the Court noted:
This history is relevant in that it supplies both the
legislative background against which Congress enacted
the 1938 Act and the relevant "backdrop" of tribal
independence.
Id. at 180.

Plaintiffs continue their use of the various short-hand references defined in
the Brief of Appellants.

In Cotton, this "legislative background" was in the
context of an Executive Order reservation and the express
authority for state taxation in the 1927 Act.

The Supreme Court

concluded that the general repealer clause of the 1938 Act did
not change the express taxing authority granted in the 1927 Act.
Id. at 182-83.
In the instant case, the "legislative background" is
the 1933 Act.-7

The 1933 Act specifically provided for revenue

to the state through a portion of the royalty instead of through
taxation.

See Section III, below.

The Government Defendants

ignore the impact of the 1933 Act on the Cotton analysis and
argue that "[t]he fact that some of [plaintiffs7] Reservation
leases under the 193 8 Indian Mineral Leasing Act happen to be on
land added by the 1933 Act is irrelevant."
18.

Brief of Appellees at

It is this factual distinction, however, which mandates a

different result.
In an attempt to create an analogous "legislative
background" under which state taxation would have been permitted,
the Government Defendants try to pigeon-hole this case into the

The Government Defendants concede that n[t]he 1927 Act, however, would not
have applied to the area created by the 1933 Act; it governed only Reservations
created by Executive Order." Brief of Appellees at 26.
The Government Defendants' concession concerning the inapplicability of the
1927 Act is significant for another reason. It highlights an error made by the
court below. In its legal conclusion no. 5 (R. 6674), the court below ruled:
If the leasing of lands in the Aneth Extension had been intended when
the 1933 Act was passed, any such leasing would have had to have taken
place under either the 1924 Act or the 1927 Act, both of which
authorized taxation by states of non-Indian producers of oil and gas.
(Emphasis added).

1924 Act.-7

To do this, the Government Defendants must

establish that the Aneth lands were "bought and paid for."

As

shown below, in Section II, this was simply not the case.
The Cotton Court's essential finding that, "at least as
to Executive Order reservations, state taxation of non-member oil
and gas lessees was the norm from the very start," 490 U.S. at
182, did not exist with regard to the Aneth Extension.

Cotton

does not support the ruling of the lower court.
B.

The Government Defendants Rely on Disputed Facts.
In an attempt to squeeze this case into the mold of

Cotton, the Government Defendants go so far as to rely on the
only disputed issues of fact which exist in this case.

Unlike

the Supreme Court in Cotton, this Court has no factual findings
made, following a trial, by the lower court.i7

Not only is

there no record upon which to conclude that "[a]ny actual
financial impact on the Tribe was 'simply too indirect and too
insubstantial to support [plaintiffs'] claim of pre-emption,'"
Brief of Appellees at 17, quoting
disputed.

(R. 6195-202).

Cotton, but these facts were

The Government Defendants' claim that

"every difference between the facts of Cotton and the facts of
this case cuts against the Oil Companies,"

Brief of Appellees at

18 n. 14, is true only if this Court is willing to accept the

The Government Defendants contend that the result would be the same under the
Cotton analysis for leases on reservations covered by the 1924 Act, since both the
1924 and 1927 Acts provide specifically for state taxation. However, even the
Supreme Court in Cotton recognized that there may be factual situations where the
state tax is pre-empted, such as where "the State has had nothing to do with the onreservation activity, save tax it." 490 U.S. at 186.
In reaching the conclusion quoted by the Government Defendants, "that federal
law . . . does not pre-empt [state] taxes," Brief of Appellees at 17, quoting
Cotton, 4 90 U.S. at 186, the Supreme Court noted that it was relying on factual
determinations made after trial. 490 U.S. at 185.

3

disputed facts as the Government Defendants presented them.-7
This would be contrary to the established standards for deciding
motions for summary judgments.

Hill v. Seattle First National

Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah App. 1992) (facts must be construed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion in
the court below).
C.

The Fact That the Land at Issue Here Was Added by the
1933 Act is Significant,
The Government Defendants turn historical events and

the Supreme Court's Cotton analysis on their head, and assert
that "the 1933 Act could be viewed as overriding the 193 8 Mineral
Leasing Act if and only if it affirmatively barred State
taxation."

Brief of Appellees at 18 (emphasis in original).

This statement is not supported by citation.

Nor could it be.

It is utterly inconsistent with the instrumentality doctrine
(which was in place in 1933) and with the analysis followed in
Cotton.
1.

At the Time the 1933 Act Was Passed, Congressional
Silence Entailed a Broad-Based Immunity From
Taxation for Private Parties Doing Business With
Indian Tribes.

The Government Defendants' assertion that Congress
would have had to act "affirmatively" in 1933 to bar state
taxation ignores the undisputed reality that the instrumentality

The Government Defendants claim that "Utah's regulation of plaintiffs'
activities and provision of services to them are significantly greater than the
regulation and services provided by New Mexico to appellant Cotton." Brief of
Appellees at 18 n. 14. There is no finding by the lower court to support this
statement. The level of regulation and services provided by the State was
specifically disputed in Plaintiffs7 Joint Response to Defendants7 Statement of
Material Facts. (R. 6182-91). The Government Defendants further claim that the
"[sjervices provided throughout the Utah Strip are more extensive and much more
comparable to revenues from the Utah Strip than was the case in Cotton Petroleum."
Brief of Appellee at 18 n. 14. Again, there is no lower court finding, and this
point was specifically disputed by plaintiffs. (R. 6195-202).

doctrine was firmly in place in 1933.-1

Cal. Bd. of

Equalization v. Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844, 848 (recognizing
that it was with the 1937 opinion in James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), that "the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity started a long path in decline. . . . " ) .
States recognized this fact in the amicus

The United

brief the Government

Defendants call "instructive," and attach to their brief.

There,

the United States recognized that "it is true, Congress
formerly27 acted on the assumption that the immunity of the
lessee existed until waived by legislative action."
United States as Amicus

Curiae

Brief of the

at 33, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.

Texas Co.. 336 U.S. 342 (1949) (Addendum E to Brief of
Appellees).

The Government Defendants argue that the instrumentality doctrine was dead,
or at least dying, when the 1933 Act was passed. Brief of Appellees at 29 n. 25.
However, the cases they cite do not support this proposition. Taber v. Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 300 U.S. 1 (1937), involved a state tax on mining
equipment owned by the lessee, not on the oil being produced. In addition, it was
decided in 1937, well after the 1933 Act was passed. Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S. 325 (1933), held that a state ad valorem
tax was valid only when placed on oil after it was moved off Indian land and
constituted the lessees private property. In addition, this case was decided after
the 1933 Act had been debated for three years and passed by the House. Group No.
1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279 (1931), affirmed Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S.
501 (1922), and the instrumentality doctrine in the context of oil company lessees
on Indian lands, but held that a tax on the lessee was valid where, under Texas law,
a mineral lessee is considered a purchaser of the underlying minerals rather than
a lessee acting as a government instrumentality. In fact, the Supreme Court later
recognized that Group No. 1 did not reject the instrumentality doctrine nor did it
even "impair the Gillespie rationale." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 33 6 U.S.
342, 358 (1949).
It is important to note that three years after the passage of the 1933 Act,
the Supreme Court, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization,
299 U.S. 159 (1936), recognized the health of the instrumentality doctrine. In that
case the Court stated: "The taxes in question are a gross production tax and a net
proceeds tax, and it is conceded that the State is without power to apply either to
the production under this lease, save and except as Congress may have given its
assent." Id. at 161. Further, the dissent in Cotton strongly points out the
weaknesses in the majority's contention that the demise of the instrumentality
doctrine pre-dated even the 1938 Act. 490 U.S. at 196-98 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
7/

The United States' amicus brief was prepared in August 194 8, after the
instrumentality doctrine had been overruled.
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In that brief, the United States also recognized, as
plaintiffs noted in their opening brief, that congressional
intent must be construed in light of the contemporaneous cases:
"[Congress'] silence during this period must be interpreted in
the setting of the contemporaneous judicial decisions."
33, 34, citing

Id. at

Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48

(1943) .
Even the Supreme Court in Cotton implicitly recognized
this reality when it noted:
It bears emphasis that although congressional
silence no longer entails a broad-based immunity
from taxation for private parties doing business
with Indian tribes, federal pre-emption is not
limited to cases in which Congress has expressly
- - a s compared to impliedly -- pre-empted the state
activity.
(Emphasis added.)
490 U.S. at 176-77.
At the time the 1933 Act was passed, congressional
silence did entail a broad-based immunity from taxation for
private parties doing business with Indian tribes.
2•

The 193 8 Act Did Not Change the Way Revenue Flows
to the State Under the 1933 Act.

The misstatement by the Government Defendants (that
Congress would have had to have acted "affirmatively" in 1933 to
bar state taxation) also points out why their logic that this
case is the same as Cotton must fail.

It is precisely because

the issue of state taxation was addressed in the 1933 Act, rather
than the 1927 Act (or the 1924 Act), that this case is
distinguishable from Cotton.
The Government Defendants would lead this Court to
believe that the Supreme Court in Cotton determined that the 1938

Act contained a clear statement supporting taxation of oil
producers.

The Supreme Court said, however, that "[t]he 1938 Act

neither expressly permits state taxation nor expressly precludes
i t 9 !.£/

490 u#s#

at

177<

^ 3 instrumentality doctrine did not

require the Court in Cotton to find that no taxes were permitted
precisely because the 1927 Act expressly provided for taxation on
the affected lands.

The 1938 Act, by its silence, did nothing to

change that effect on lands governed by the 1927 Act.

Cotton,

490 U.S. at 182-83.
The 1933 Act, however, provided for revenue for the
state in the form of a percentage of the royalty, and consciously
failed to expressly allow state taxation, thereby intending that
no such taxes be allowed.

See Section III, below.

The 1938 Act,

by its silence, did nothing to change that effect on lands
governed by the 1933 Act.

Accordingly, the conclusion in this

case is different than the conclusion reached in Cotton.
The Government Defendants appear to suggest that the
1933 Congress would have needed to foresee the demise of the
federal instrumentality doctrine and, anticipating that future
event, acted in a manner consistent with the state of the law in
the future.
3.

Comparing Oklahoma

Tax

Comm'n v.

Texas

to this

Case Does Not Change the Result.
8/

The Government Defendants' liberties with the import of Cotton are apparent
from their incomplete quotations. For example, the Government Defendants state that
the Supreme Court "concluded that, far from prohibiting state taxes, the [193 8 Act]
manifested Congress's 'intent to permit state taxation of non-member lessees.'"
Brief of Appellees at 16 (emphasis added), quoting
Cotton, 490 U.S. at 183. The
Court actually said: "Thus, Congress' approaches to both the 1927 and 1938 Acts
were fully consistent with an intent to permit state taxation of non-member
lessees." 4 90 U.S. at 182-83. Thus, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend
with the 193 8 Act to change the law with respect to state taxation. Where the
taxation alternative had been rejected, as in the 1933 Act, the 1938 Act was also
consistent with the royalty provision.

7

The Government Defendants' ability to confuse the
issues reigns supreme with regard to their discussion of Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).

That case did not

address "precisely the question" raised in this appeal, as
asserted by the Government Defendants,lf
at 29.

Brief of Appellees

The statements quoted by the Government Defendants

concern the Court's rejection of the contention that because
Congress had acted on several occasions to expressly permit
Oklahoma to tax mineral production on some of the Indian
reservations in the state, the absence of any congressional
action implied a grant of immunity with regard to other Indian
reservations in Oklahoma.

336 U.S. at 366-67.

It was in the

context of this novel argument that the Court made the quoted
statements which dealt with whether Congress, by acting with
regard to some reservations but not others, had created an
immunity on the other reservations by its silence.

Brief of

Appellees at 30-32.
Hence, the issue in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co. is
unlike the situation presented here.

Plaintiffs are asking this

Court to determine congressional intent in the context of

That case dealt with the extension of the United States Supreme Court's
reversal of the instrumentality doctrine in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376 (1938). In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., the Supreme Court
overturned an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision which "rested flatly on the ground
that the lessee was an instrumentality of the Federal Government," 336 U.S. at 348,
and applied the pre-Helvering line of cases. The Supreme Court rejected the
Oklahoma court's distinguishing Helvering on the basis that it dealt with income
taxes assessed against the lessee. Id. at 348-49, 362-65. The Court expressly
overruled several pre-Helvering cases. Id.

specific legislation affecting tribal lands, not in the absence
of legislative action.—7
II.

THE 1924 ACT NEVER APPLIED TO THE ANETH EXTENSION LANDS.
The Government Defendants do not dispute plaintiffs'

contention that the 192 0 General Leasing Act did not address
mineral leasing on Indian reservations generally, and the Aneth
Extension specifically.

See Brief of Appellant at 27.

In

addition, as noted above, the Government Defendants concede that
the lower court erroneously relied on the 1927 Act as a source of
authority for leasing on the Aneth Extension lands.

Brief of

Appellees at 26.
Accordingly, the Government Defendants' defense of the
lower court's ruling has been reduced to the alleged
applicability of the 1924 Act to the Aneth Extension.

Absent

that application, the entire rationale for their reliance on
Cotton, and, therefore, the lower court's decision, must fall.
The lower court's (and the Government Defendants')
conclusion cannot be adopted for at least two reasons:

1) the

Aneth Extension lands are not "bought and paid for;" and 2) the
lower court never made the necessary factual findings to support
its legal conclusion.

Finally, the fact that neither the 1924

nor the 1927 Acts applied to the Aneth Extension is not
"untenable."

Brief of Appellees at 26.

—
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co. can also be distinguished because the subject
lands were allotted and restricted rather than tribal.
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A.

The Aneth Extension was Not "Bought and Paid For"
Because the Aneth Lands Were Not Added to the
Reservation in Exchange for a Cession of Other Lands or
Rights.
"The term 'bought and paid for' does not have a

recognized meaning in Indian property law, nor has it appeared in
other statutes.

The legislative history of the 1891 Act sheds no

light on the meaning of the phrase."

F. Cohen, Handbook of

Federal Indian Law, 529 n. 5 (1982 ed.).

In spite of this state

of the law, the Government Defendants make the bold statement
that "[t]he Aneth Extension is a 'bought and paid for' addition
to the Navajo Reservation.nll/
and at 25.

Brief of Appellees at 21 n. 17

That statement is neither supported by the factual

findings of the trial court, nor the judicial interpretations of
the phrase "bought and paid for."
1.

"Bought and Paid For" Reguires the Presence of
Consideration.

The few cases which discuss the phrase "bought and paid
for" focus on the presence of consideration coming from the

—'
The Government Defendants begin their detailed analysis of the meaning of
"bought and paid for" with a misstatement of plaintiffs' position. The Government
Defendants suggest that plaintiffs contended below that British-American interpreted
the phrase "bought and paid for" as applying to lands reserved by treaty, but not
to lands reserved by legislation. Brief of Appellees at 24. Plaintiffs' memorandum
referred to by the Government Defendants clearly stated the phrase had been applied
to a narrow category of legislatively created reservation lands, following a
detailed analysis of the historical background of the lands. Plaintiffs' Answer to
Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment at 31 n. 53 (R. 6111). While it is
true that legislative enactments can be considered "bought and paid for" in certain
situations, legislative enactments are generally considered in a separate category,
as this Court has recognized:
Counsel for the appellant are probably correct when they say that
there are two classes of lands occupied by Indians, in one of which
they are "bought and paid for," and in the other they are not. The one
class consists of specific tracts acquired by purchase, exchange, or
surrender by treaty. The other comprises reservations created by
executive order or legislative enactment. . . .
Strawberry Valley Cattle Co. v. Chipman, 13 Utah 454, 45 P. 348, 350 (1896) .

Indians.—7

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765, n. 3

(1985) (phrase includes "land reserved for the Indians in
exchange for their cession or surrender of other lands or
rights . . . . " ) ; British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 162 (1936) (the history reviewed by
the Court "disclosed various considerations moving from the
Indians to the Government and the reverse . . . . " ) ;

Strawberry

Valley Cattle Co. v. Chipman, 13 Utah 454, 45 P. 348, 351 (1896)
("The surrender of these rights by the Indians constituted a
valuable and the moving consideration for the lands which they
acquired for their places of abode in the future.").
Recognizing that they must, at a minimum, show that the
1933 Act included a surrender of rights by the Navajos, the
Government Defendants summarily conclude that "the Navajo quite
clearly ceded 'rights' in exchange for the Aneth Extension."
Brief of Appellees at 25.

The sole support for this conclusion

is "the face of the 1933 Act itself." w

Id.

The Government Defendants are wrong for two reasons:
1) the allotments referred to in the 1933 Act are not substantial

— A l t h o u g h the courts have consistently found that consideration was necessary,
they also agree that it need not be cash or the equivalent. British-American, 299
U.S. at 164 ("the proviso has been construed as not confined to lands acquired by
Indians through the payment of a consideration in money, but equally including lands
reserved for Indians in return for a cession or surrender by them of other lands,
possessions or rights."); Strawberry Valley, 45 P. at 351 (recognizing that "the
words . . . signify a purchase, either by the payment of money, or exchange or
surrender of other property or possessions.")
—
The only "fact" before the lower court (and the only fact included in the
lower court's Findings of Fact, *{ 8, Addendum J to Brief of Appellants) and the only
"fact" relied upon by the Government Defendants, was the language in the 193 3 Act,
which stated:
Provided,
That no further allotments of lands to Indians on the public
domain shall be made in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian
homesteads be made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 (23
Stat. 96; U.S.C., title 43, sec. 190).
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current interests in land, or the kind of "rights" which could
constitute "consideration" supporting a determination that they
were "bought and paid for;" and 2) the Navajo Tribe surrendered
no rights.
2.

The Consideration Must be of a Significant Right
or a Present Interest in Land.

Although the Supreme Court did not define its use of
the general term "rights," the Court's application of the word in
this context indicates that it means a substantial current
interest in land, or something equivalent.

In British-American,

the Supreme Court noted that the Blackfeet Tribe surrendered part
of their current reservation for different lands to be added to
what remained of their reservation.—7

This accords with other

applications of the "bought and paid for" language.—7
The congressional action in 1933 was of a different
order.

The Aneth Extension did not involve the surrender by the

Navajos of any land in exchange for the land being added to the
Reservation.

Nor was the land added pursuant to any "agreements

—'
British-American does not hold, as the Government Defendants argue, that all
reservations created by legislation are "bought and paid for." In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court in British-American conducted a detailed analysis
concerning how land was added by various exchanges, including treaties, executive
orders and acts of Congress, to the Blackfeet reservation and noted that the subject
lands were added through "agreements or conventions which were ratified and given
effect by Congress." 299 U.S. at 162-63. Those agreements involved the surrender
of certain lands to which the Indians had existing rights, in exchange for other
lands being "set apart as the tribe's future reservation." Id. at 16 3.
—/
Every court that has construed the term "bought and paid for" has done so in
the context of a land exchange. Montana v. Blackfeet involved the same reservation
as British-American. Strawberry Valley involved the surrender of lands in Colorado
to which the Indians "had title by right of possession as original occupants" for
lands with reservation status in Utah. 4 5 P. at 3 51. The Supreme Court in BritishAmerican cited to an opinion from an Assistant Attorney General to the Secretary of
the Interior where it was noted "that the Indians on this reservation gave up what
were to them valuable rights for the purpose of securing a place for permanent
homes . . . ." 25 Pub. Lands Dec. 408, 413 (1897).

or conventions" of the type involved in British-American and
Strawberry Valley.
Instead, the 1933 Act resulted from unilateral
congressional action adding lands needed by the Navajo Tribe.—7
There was no land being returned to the public domain by the
Indians in exchange for the added lands.
3.

The Future Allotments Precluded by the 1933 Act
Did Not Constitute Adequate Consideration.

The future allotments precluded by the 1933 Act were
rights of individual Indians, not of the Navajo Tribe.
generally

See

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649,

651 (1976) ("The objects of this policy [allotment] were to end
tribal land ownership and to substitute private ownership.").

A

tribe was not authorized to apply for an allotment or a

— C o n g r e s s i o n a l hearings regarding the 1933 Act confirm that Congress7 intent
was simply to add lands to the reservation without receiving consideration from the
Navajos:
Mr. Rhoads. Gentlemen, I think you can really help us here. Here is
a chance to get 600,000 acres of land for the Indians, which
they want, and which they are occupying. Apparently we can not
get it without conceding this 37% per cent [to the State of
Utah]. What is the choice that we ought to make?
Senator Wheeler. If you can get it without giving them the 3 7M per
cent, I would say you ought to get it. If you can not get it
that way, then you ought to give it.
Mr. Rhoads. That is our judgment and that is why we introduced the
bill with the 37M per cent.
Mr. Rhoads. . . . We are trying to get this land for the Indians.
Senator Bratton. I might say in regard to that bill, there was quite
a lot of objections raised to it from the people out there and
I have on file their objections.
Senator Wheeler. There is not anything being taken away from the
Indians. It is something that is being given to them?
Mr. Rhoads. Yes, sir.
Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings on S.R. 79, 3 08,
2 63 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 4562 (1931) (hereinafter Indian Conditions), relied on in The 1933 Addition
to the Navajo Reservation in Utah, attached as Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of John R.
Alley, Jr. (R. 6304, 6358-66) (hereinafter the "Alley Report").
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homestead.—7

In all the cases where "bought and paid for" is

discussed, the rights ceded by the Indians were tribal rights to
possession of land.—7
In addition, the "right" to obtain allotments
referenced in the 1933 Act was not a current interest in land.
The individual Indians merely lost the "right" to apply for
allotments and homesteads.

Thus, they were "giving up" the

possibility of future allotments and homesteads -- rights they
might never have received.—7
Under the decisions of the Supreme Court in British-American
and this Court in Strawberry Valley, the Aneth Extension lands
cannot be considered "bought and paid for" under the 1924 Act.
The Navajo Tribe was not surrendering land or other significant
rights sufficient to constitute consideration for the land.

The

lands in question were added by a legislative enactment which was
not a ratification of an earlier agreement between the Government
and the Navajo Tribe.

—7
Public domain allotment is governed by 25 U.S.C. § 334 which states:
"Where
any Indian not residing upon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation has
been provided by treaty, Act of Congress, or executive order, shall make settlement
upon any . . . lands . . . not otherwise appropriated, he or she shall be
entitled . . . to have the same allotted to him or her." Homesteads are governed
by 43 U.S.C. § 190 which states: "Indians . . . may avail themselves of the
provisions of the homestead laws as fully and to the same extent as may now be done
by citizens of the United States . . . .
[T]he United States does and will hold the
land . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian by whom such entry
shall have been made."
(Emphasis added).
—7
Montana v. Blackfeet, 471 U.S. at 765 n. 3; British-American, 2.99 U.S. at 16265; Strawberry Valley, 45 P. at 350-52.
—7
By 1933, the rights of individual Indians to obtain allotments were not worth
very much. A movement which began in the late 1920's and early 1930's "marked a
change in attitude in Indian policy and a departure from many of the assimilationist
policies of the allotment era." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 144
(footnote omitted).
In 1933, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs used his
administrative powers to "effectively end[ ] . . . the allotment process." Id. at
146 .

In any event, a remand is required if the lower court's
ruling requires the application of the 1924 Act because
inadequate findings were made.
999 (Utah 1987) .

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,

To support its conclusion that the State can

tax the plaintiffs, the lower court stated that the Aneth
Extension must fall under either the 1924 or the 1927 Act.
However, there was no discussion or finding that the Aneth
Extension was either "bought and paid for" land or Executive
Order land.

Such a finding is essential to the ultimate

conclusion.

Its absence requires, at the very least, a remand.

B.

The Fact That the Aneth Extension Was Not Covered by
Either the 1924 or 1927 Acts Was Not so Unusual,
The Government Defendants assert that it is "absurd" to

believe that there could be a five year gap in the leasing
statutes between 1933 and 1938 during which no mineral leasing
statute was applicable to the lands added by the Aneth Extension.
Brief of Appellees at 25-27.

It was not so unusual in the early

part of the century, however, for land to be included in an
Indian reservation for which there was no authority to execute
leases.

In fact, one of the reasons for the 1938 Act was to fill

in gaps and make the leasing of Indian mineral rights uniform.
The treaties, executive orders and acts of Congress
which have set aside, modified and eliminated Indian reservations
are numerous.

Over the course of our nation's history the policy

of the federal government toward the Indian has changed
dramatically.
Law, 47-206.

See generally

F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian

The statutory scheme for leasing minerals on Indian

reservations was the result of a patch-work of many different
15

laws over many years which, prior to the 1938 Act, "left the law
governing mineral leases on tribal lands in a state of
confusion."

Id. at 534.

Not only was it inevitable that some

lands would not be covered by this scheme, there were examples of
other gaps in the legal framework until a comprehensive leasing
statute was enacted in 1938.

These, the Government Defendants

choose to ignore.
For example, leasing was not available at all on Indian
lands until 1891, and then only on "bought and paid for" lands.
Id. at 533.

And on lands added by Executive Orders, which had

been used since at least 1871,—7 see

United States v. Southern

Pacific Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1976), it was
not until 1927 that a leasing statute was enacted.
Thus, leasing of Executive Order lands was in a state
of ambiguity for over fifty years*—7

For lands not falling

under either the 1924 or the 1927 Acts, such as the Aneth
Extension, leasing was not authorized until the passage of the
1938 Act.
From the legislative history to the 1938 Act, it is
clear that Congress recognized that leasing authority on Indian
Reservations was, at best, a "patch-work" scheme.

The Supreme

—'
The status of leasing on Executive Order lands was clarified in response to
litigation in Utah arising when E.M. Harrison applied for a lease under the 1920
General Leasing Act on part of the Navajo Reservation set aside by Executive Order.
Interior Secretary Herbert Fall's decision that the lease was governed by the 192 0
Act was reversed by Attorney General Harlan Stone. The case was eventually
certified to the United States Supreme Court, but the debate was settled by passage
of the 1927 Act. See generally
Leasing of Executive Order Reservations: Hearings
before the Subcomm. of the House of Rep. Committee on Indian Affairs, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. exhibits D, E, F (1926) (hereinafter Leasing Hearings), relied on in Alley
Report (R. 6315-18) .
—/
Congress put a stop to the use of Executive Orders to create reservations in
1919. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 27, 41 Stat. 34 (codified at 43 U.S.C § 150).

Court, too, has repeatedly recognized the role of the 193 8 Act in
alleviating that confusion, noting that the 1938 Act "was
intended, in light of the disarray of federal law in the area,
'to obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law relating
to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes . . ..'"
Cotton, 490 U.S. at 178, quoting

S. Rep. No. 2; H.R. Rep. No.

1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938); see

also,

Montana v.

Blackfeet, 471 U.S. 759, 767 n. 5 (1985) . By addressing the need
for uniformity in the leasing scheme in the 1938 Act, Congress
was addressing the problems in administration and gaps in
coverage under the existing statutes.

It is not so "untenable"

or "absurd" to think that the Aneth Extension could have fallen
into one of these gaps.
III. UNDER THE 1933 ACT THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO EITHER A ROYALTY
OR TAX ON RESERVATIONS LANDS; NOT BOTH.
Plaintiffs do not contend that the State should not
derive revenue from the Aneth Extension lands.

Plaintiffs do

contend, however, that the ruling of the lower court results in a
windfall to the State of two forms of revenue where only one was
intended.
A

-

The Result Proposed by the Lower Court and the
Government Defendants Would be Unique.
The Government Defendants attempt to justify the

windfall given to them by the lower court by comparing their
situation (i.e. state taxation of lessees on Indian land) to the
situation on public domain, where states are allowed to collect
both a percentage of the royalties and taxes.
at 27, 42.

Brief of Appellees

The correct comparison, however, is with state

taxation on Indian land; not the public domain.
17

The Government

Defendants do not contest the fact that the 1920 Act, which
governs leases on the public domain, does not apply here.
Brief of Appellant at 27.

See

They have not identified any other

situation where a state has been permitted to tax and collect a
percentage of the royalties from production of oil and gas on an
Indian reservation.—7
B.

The Government Defendants Ignore the Congressional
Debate Concerning Taxation and Royalties as
Alternatives.
The Government Defendants attempt to detract the Court

from the heart of the issues considered in connection with the
1933 Act by claiming that the entirety of the "debate" regarding
the revenue alternatives -- royalties and taxation -- was limited
to an un-enacted bill prior to the 1927 Act which contained the
phrase "in lieu of taxes."

They state that plaintiffs "contend

that the 1933 Act was modeled after the bill that did not become
law.

Therefore, . . . the phrase

x

in lieu of taxes' contained in

the unenacted bill should be read into the 1933 Act, although the
statute says no such thing."—7

Brief of Appellees at 34-35.

—/
In 1931, John Collier, Executive Secretary of the American Indian Defense
Association testified before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs that there was no law anywhere in the United States where a portion of the
royalties was to be paid to a state. Indian Conditions, supra n. 16, at 4400.
The Government Defendants' reference to the Kiowa legislation, Brief of
Appellees at 39 n. 35, is incomplete. That legislation was not "analogous to the
1933 Act." Id. The land involved in that legislation was not part of any Indian
reservation. Congress noted that it had been determined by the Supreme Court to be
"public land." S. Rep. No. 492, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926). Oil and gas
leasing on that land was governed by the 1920 Act. Id.
—/
The argument that the "in lieu of taxes" language is implied in the 1933 Act
was put forward not by the plaintiffs, but by the Director of the Utah Division of
Indian Affairs, Bruce G. Parry (R. 6405-06). Even Mr. Parry, however, never
maintained that the "in lieu of taxes" language was actually in the 1933 Act, but
merely that the 193 3 Act conveyed the intent of Congress to give Utah 3 7%% of the
Navajo royalties to be, in effect, "in lieu of taxes." The Government Defendants'
attempt to escape the impact of the UDIA Regulations and Policies by referring to
the 1990 Parry Reply Affidavit (R. 6463). Plaintiffs believe that the UDIA
document, written at the time Mr. Parry was in a position of authority, speaks for

Having invented this argument on our behalf, the Government
Defendants immediately pronounce it "far-fetched."
Appellees at 35.

Brief of

The problem with the Government Defendants'

argument is that it is found nowhere in the Brief of
Appellants.—7
Plaintiffs do contend that in 1933 Congress understood
that taxation and royalties were mutually exclusive alternatives.
This is abundantly clear from the debate preceding passage of the
1927 Act.— 7

It is also evidenced by the fact that the 1927 Act

contained only a taxation provision unaccompanied by the royalty
alternative so extensively debated.

This debate carried over

into the consideration of the 1933 legislation.

itself. The Parry Affidavit now advanced by the Government Defendants is contrary
to the interpretation of the 1933 Act originally taken by Mr. Parry.
Mr. Parry's most recent affidavit to the effect that he "always felt" that the
Aneth royalty was to be in lieu of taxation of only Indians, cannot stand scrutiny.
For example, his new opinion runs directly contrary to the "legal and historical
research" on which Mr. Parry claims the original UDIA document was based. Since it
was well accepted in 1933 that Indians and their property were tax exempt, Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 How.) 737
(1867) , there would be no reason for Congress to debate providing the state 3 7M% of
the royalty "in lieu of taxation of Indians."
—
The Government Defendants similarly invent support for their position by
implying congressional intent from a debate where the revenue alternatives were not
even discussed. Brief of Appellees at 45-47. The issue at the time of the 1968
amendment was the scope of who the intended beneficiaries of the royalty were.
Nowhere did Congress identify the State as one of those beneficiaries.
—'
The Conference Report from S. 876, one of the predecessors to the 1927 Act
containing a royalty provision, noted:
The amendment to the original text of the bill substitutes a definite
share in the bonuses, rentals, and royalties from the oil, gas, coal,
etc., for the right to tax the production of minerals granted to the
State by the House amendment.
H.R. Rep. No. 1637, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1925) (to accompany S. 876), relied on
in the Alley Report (R. 6337).
Similarly, statements were made during a debate of a version of the 1927 Act
containing a royalty rather than taxation provision. Leasing- Hearings, supra n. 20,
at 43-47, relied on in the Alley Report (R. 6321-43).
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C.

The Congressional Debate Concerning the 1933 Act
Specifically Referenced Taxation and Royalties as
Alternatives.
The first bill regarding addition of grazing lands for

the Navajos was proposed in March, 1930.

Utah objected to the

omission of any revenue provision for the State of Utah in that
bill and Utah Congressman, Don Colton, introduced the next
version (H.R. 16464) January 22, 1931.

H.R. 16464 included a

royalty provision for the State of Utah.—7

The State of Utah

and San Juan County approved H.R. 16464, in part because the
royalty provision was added.—7

The State also recognized the

alternatives, as evidenced by the Memorandum Agreement made
between a committee of nine citizens (representing the citizens
of Blanding, Utah) and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Regarding the 1933 Act.

H.R. Rep. No. 1883, Permanently Set

Aside Certain Lands in Utah as an Addition to the Navajo Indian
Reservation, 72nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1933).

In paragraph 4 of that

agreement, the committee clearly referenced the fact that the
royalty provision was an alternative to state taxation:
4. The 37M royalty clause in the above bill is to
remain, but the State of Utah is free to chancre to the
usual form. (Emphasis added).

—'

Colton reported that the previous bill:
would not be acceptable to the State of Utah unless a provision
was included in the bill whereby the Indians in case of the
discovery of oil should get a certain percentage of the oil.
Therefore, there has been put in that bill a provision that in
the case of the Piute [sic] strip the State of Utah shall be
entitled in case of oil discoveries to 37% percent of the
royalties.

Indian Conditions, supra n. 16, at 4561, relied on in the Alley Report (R. 6357-58) .
Unlike the 1926 attempts to use the royalty arrangement for Executive Order
reservations, Colton's bill did not limit how the State could spend the royalty.
—/
supra

Congress recognized that Utah's cooperation was necessary. Indian Conditions,
n. 16, at 4561-62, relied on in the Alley Report (R. 6357-58, 6366) .

Id.
Even after Utah's acceptance of the bill, however,
congressional debate continued with respect to the royalty
provision because the normal way for the state to receive revenue
from the reservation was through taxation.—7

Debate on the

Senate floor prior to passage of the 1933 Act— 7 shows that the
Senators were aware of the trade off between a royalty sharing
arrangement and state taxation:
Senator Wheeler.—7 If there is no difference between the
3 7M percent and the taxes, I would suggest that you
take it up with Senator Smoot and the Utah
representatives and see if they will not agree to the
same provision that you put into this law [the 1927
Act].
(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Hagerman.—7 That is a matter for the strategy of the
Senate, with which we have nothing to do.
Mr. Rhoads.—7 We are interested in the attitude of
Senator Smoot and Senator King in this effort to secure
lands for the Indians. Representative Colton has taken

28 /

—
Many in Congress were concerned that inclusion of the royalty provision
implied a surrender of Indian tribal ownership of Indian resources because of the
historical connection between the royalty provision and the 1920 Act.
Indian
Conditions, supra
n. 16, at 4370, 4400-4554, relied on in the Alley Report (R. 632838) .
2 9/

—
In these hearings, Congress was considering whether Hagerman had adequately
represented the Indians' interests in connection with the 1927 Act. Indian
supporters claimed his proposals actually diverted property or income from the
Indians. These hearings addressed both the history of the 1927 Act and the pending
bill later becoming the 1933 Act. The connection which the Government Defendants
call "far-fetched" was clearly debated. See generally
Indian Conditions, supra
n.
16.
— S e n a t o r Burton K. Wheeler was a member of a special subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs surveying the conditions of the Indians of the
United States. Indian Conditions, supra n. 16, at 4347. He questioned Herbert
J. Hagerman extensively.
(R. 6361-62). He was also involved in discussions of
executive order leasing, leading up to the 1927 Act.
— H e r b e r t J. Hagerman was a Bureau of Indian Affairs official who strongly
supported the royalty provisions of the 1927 Act (R. 6361) . Although the
Government Defendants attempt to discredit Hagerman, Brief of Appellees at 36-37,
they, too, rely on his expertise and involvement in these debates. See Brief of
Appellees at 41 n. 36.
32/

—
supra

At that time, Rhoads was Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
n. 16, at 4347, relied on in the Alley Report (R. 6363) .
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Indian Conditions,

a personal interest and has gone out and gone over the
ground and has been very helpful, and, as I said
before, we introduced the bill without any reservation
for the State first. Then, as a result of his visit to
the State, he was compelled to say that it could not be
passed without the concession.
Indian Conditions, supra

n. 16, at 4563, relied on in the Alley

Report (R. 6368-69).
While neither version of the bills being discussed was
passed,—7 it was reintroduced as H.R. 11735 on April 30, 1932.
This version was the same as that later passed as S. 5541 and
included the requirement that the state of Utah spend the 3 7M
percent royalty for the education of Indian school children or
for roads across the reservation.

S. Doc. No. 64, 72nd Cong.,

1st Sess. 38-44, 62 (1932), relied on in the Alley Report (R.
6375).

The bill, as signed March 1, 1933, included the royalty

provision but did not waive immunity for state taxation.

—/
Hagerman wrote that the Navajo Tribal Council had been informed that the
Paiute Strip bill had not passed »*because objection had been made to it by the
Congressional Committees' and that the main objection vwas the matter of the 3 7M3
royalties.'" (Alley, R. 6372).

D.

The Alley Affidavit Provides a Comprehensive Analysis
of the Legislative History.
The Government Defendants attempt to dismiss the study

of John Alley, plaintiffs' expert historian, whose affidavit and
historical analysis detailing the debates were uncontested by
competent evidence.—7

Their justification for ignoring the

Alley Report was only that n[t]he trial court did not accord any
weight to Mr. Alley's report."

Brief of Appellees at 34.

Because the lower court did not want to go through the Alley
Report "to try to separate fact from legal conclusion,"
Memorandum Decision at 2 (R. 6621), it apparently chose to ignore
the facts presented in the Alley Affidavit and supporting report.
The lower court adopted the Government Defendants' view of
history and ignored key facts.

The Government Defendants choose

to completely ignore the uncontradicted evidence relied on in the
Alley Report.

The Alley Report nevertheless is a competent,

comprehensive, and well-documented analysis of the legislative
history pertinent to the issues in this case.
CONCLUSION
The contention of the Government Defendants, that
Cotton controls this case, is wrong.

Application of the Cotton

analysis in the context of the instrumentality doctrine and the
1933 Act clearly leads to a different result.
The arguments of the Government Defendants depend
entirely upon the assumption that the Aneth Extension was "bought

—
The Government Defendants are wrong when they say plaintiffs "rely not on any
House or Senate committee reports, or on anything said by any members of
Congress . . . ." Brief of Appellees at 36. The Alley Report is extensively
documented with numerous citations to the legislative history. It is the only
comprehensive analysis of the history of the period presented to the lower court.
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and paid for," and thereby covered by Cotton.

This conclusion is

incorrect because the Navajo Tribe was not surrendering land or
other significant rights sufficient to constitute consideration
for the land.
The legislative history of the 1933 Act establishes
that Congress only intended to provide for revenue to the states
through the 37%% royalty.

The lower court's ruling defies that

intent and results in an unintended windfall to the state through
both taxes and royalties.
The decision of the lower court cannot be sustained.
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